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What Is a Neocloud? How AI GPU Clouds Make and Lose Money

A neocloud rents out Nvidia-class GPUs to AI labs and big tech. Here is who the neoclouds are, how the money flows from customers to lenders and suppliers, what the numbers in their filings mean, and where the risks sit, with every figure dated.

Published Updated 10 min readHow we research

Key takeaways

  • A neocloud is a company whose main business is renting GPU computing power to AI developers and big tech, usually under multi-year take-or-pay contracts and largely funded with debt. CoreWeave, Nebius and IREN are the best-known listed examples (October 2026).
  • The scale is large and the profits are not there yet: CoreWeave reported $2.575 billion of revenue for Q2 2026, a $104 billion revenue backlog and a $626 million net loss, with $640 million of net interest expense against a $49 million operating loss.
  • Customers are few and big. Microsoft was about 67% of CoreWeave’s 2025 revenue (10-K), and three unnamed customers made up 36%, 26% and 10% of Q2 2026 revenue (10-Q).
  • There are two models with different risks: GPU clouds own the chips and sell computing time (CoreWeave, Nebius, IREN); landlords build powered data centers and lease them out (Applied Digital, TeraWulf).
  • Gartner said on October 14, 2026 that over 80% of neocloud providers will “cease independent operations” by 2030. That includes being acquired; it is not a forecast that 80% go bankrupt.

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What is a neocloud, in simple terms?

A neocloud is a cloud company built almost entirely around one product: access to large clusters of AI chips (GPUs), rented to the companies that train and run AI models. If the company’s revenue comes mostly from GPU capacity sold under contracts to AI labs and big tech, it is a neocloud; if GPUs are one service among hundreds, as at Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure or Google Cloud, it is a hyperscaler. The word spread in 2025 as these companies grew from crypto-mining or niche hosting roots into multi-billion-dollar businesses. CoreWeave, for example, says its committed contracts are take-or-pay, run one to six years, and made up 98% of its revenue in Q2 2026.

Scope: this page explains the business model, the listed companies and how to read their numbers, for a US investor. It does not cover chipmakers (see the AI compute supply chain), data-center real estate trusts, or private-company valuations. It is education, not a recommendation to buy or sell any stock.

How money moves through a neocloud
Customers
  • Big techMicrosoft, Meta
  • AI labsOpenAI, Anthropic and others
  • Big tech → GPU cloud · multi-year take-or-pay contract
  • AI labs → GPU cloud · contract, often with a prepayment
The neocloud
  • GPU cloudCoreWeave, Nebius, IREN
  • GPU cloud → Chip and server makers · capex for GPUs and servers
  • GPU cloud → Landlords and power · rent and electricity
  • GPU cloud → Lenders · interest and principal, often paid first
Who it pays
  • LendersGPU-backed loans, bonds, converts
  • Chip and server makersNvidia, Dell, Supermicro
  • Landlords and powerdata centers, utilities
Return flows and feedback loops
  • Lenders → GPU cloud · loans secured by GPUs and contracts
Simplified. Contracts bring revenue; most of the cash to build arrives first from lenders and prepayments; lenders are repaid out of the customers’ payments.

How is a neocloud different from a hyperscaler or a data-center landlord?

The difference is what else the company earns and who owns the chips. A hyperscaler can fund GPUs from other profitable businesses; a neocloud has to fund them from contracts, debt and new shares; a landlord owns the building and power but not the GPUs. The categories blur at the edges: IREN still mined bitcoin in 2026, Nebius has other businesses, and Oracle rents out GPUs at huge scale.

Neocloud (GPU cloud)HyperscalerLandlord (powered shell / colocation)
ExamplesCoreWeave, Nebius, IRENAmazon (AWS), Microsoft (Azure), Google Cloud, OracleApplied Digital, TeraWulf, Galaxy, Core Scientific
Owns the GPUs?YesYesNo, the tenant does
Main revenueGPU hours under multi-year contractsHundreds of cloud and software servicesLong leases on buildings and power
Other cash flows to lean onLittleLarge (software, ads, retail, legacy cloud)Some (lease rent; some still mine bitcoin)
Biggest riskDebt, customer concentration, GPU obsolescenceOverspending on capexTenant credit, construction delays

Is Oracle a neocloud? Not by this definition: it reported $19.3 billion of revenue in its quarter to August 31, 2026, much of it from software, and $664 billion of remaining performance obligations. But its AI build-out has the same funding question: free cash flow was negative $5 billion in that quarter (Oracle release, Sep 10, 2026). See Oracle’s stock page for its price history.

Which companies are neoclouds? (dated table)

The listed GPU clouds are CoreWeave and Nebius, with IREN converting from bitcoin mining; the listed landlords include Applied Digital and TeraWulf. Each company reports its contracts with its own measure, so the last column is not comparable across rows; the backlog, RPO and ARR guide explains each one. Revenue is GAAP revenue for the latest reported quarter.

Company (ticker)ModelQuarterly revenue (GAAP)Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)Period
CoreWeave (CRWV)GPU cloud$2,575MRevenue backlog ~$104B (RPO $103.7B in the 10-Q)Q2 2026, to Jun 30
Nebius (NBIS)GPU cloud$582.3MARR $3.0B; customer commitments >$40BQ2 2026, to Jun 30
IREN (IREN)GPU cloud, ex-bitcoin miner$137.2M ($70.5M AI cloud)$4B contracted ARR for 2026 capacity; $1B operating ARRQ4 FY26, to Jun 30
Applied Digital (APLD)Landlord$341.9M~$36B contracted lease revenue, base terms (~1.41 GW)FQ1 FY27, to Aug 31
TeraWulf (WULF)Landlord$44.8MAnthropic lease ~$19B base term, up to ~$33B with optionsQ2 2026, to Jun 30
Oracle (ORCL), for contrastHyperscaler$19.3BRPO $664BQ1 FY27, to Aug 31
  • CoreWeave (CRWV)
    Model
    GPU cloud
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $2,575M
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    Revenue backlog ~$104B (RPO $103.7B in the 10-Q)
    Period
    Q2 2026, to Jun 30
  • Nebius (NBIS)
    Model
    GPU cloud
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $582.3M
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    ARR $3.0B; customer commitments >$40B
    Period
    Q2 2026, to Jun 30
  • IREN (IREN)
    Model
    GPU cloud, ex-bitcoin miner
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $137.2M ($70.5M AI cloud)
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    $4B contracted ARR for 2026 capacity; $1B operating ARR
    Period
    Q4 FY26, to Jun 30
  • Applied Digital (APLD)
    Model
    Landlord
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $341.9M
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    ~$36B contracted lease revenue, base terms (~1.41 GW)
    Period
    FQ1 FY27, to Aug 31
  • TeraWulf (WULF)
    Model
    Landlord
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $44.8M
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    Anthropic lease ~$19B base term, up to ~$33B with options
    Period
    Q2 2026, to Jun 30
  • Oracle (ORCL), for contrast
    Model
    Hyperscaler
    Quarterly revenue (GAAP)
    $19.3B
    Contract measure the company reports (its own definition)
    RPO $664B
    Period
    Q1 FY27, to Aug 31

Private neoclouds include Lambda, Crusoe, Fluidstack and Nscale; their numbers come from funding reports rather than audited filings, so they are left out of the table. The full side-by-side comparison, with debt, cash and customer share in one definition per column, is in neocloud stocks compared.

How do neoclouds make money, and why do they still lose it?

They earn a fixed price per GPU hour under contract and lose money after paying for the chips wearing out and the debt that bought them. Nebius said its Q2 2026 deals yielded $20–25 million of annual contract value per megawatt, with prepayments covering 50–60% of the related capex and an estimated payback of 1 year 10 months (company estimate). The unaudited quarterly income statement shows where the money goes. Worked example, CoreWeave Q2 2026 (three months to Jun 30, in millions):

Line (CoreWeave Q2 2026)$ millionsRunning total
Revenue2,5752,575
Operating expenses (incl. 1,393 of depreciation)−2,624−49 operating loss
Interest expense, net−640−689
Other income, net+125−564 loss before tax
Income tax−62−626 net loss
Adjusted EBITDA (company, non-GAAP): adds back depreciation, interest, tax, stock pay and other items1,51059% of revenue

Both lines are true at once: a 59% adjusted EBITDA margin and a 24% net loss margin. The gap is mostly depreciation (the GPUs losing value; CoreWeave depreciates computing equipment over six years) and interest. The cash statement shows how the build is paid for: in the first half of 2026 CoreWeave spent $14.1 billion on property and equipment, generated $3.7 billion from operations and raised $16.7 billion of new debt while repaying $5.2 billion (10-Q). Whether six years is the right life for an AI chip is its own debate, covered in how long AI GPUs last.

Who are the customers, and who lends the money?

A handful of very large buyers on one side and a stack of secured and unsecured lenders on the other. CoreWeave’s 10-K says Microsoft was about 67% of 2025 revenue and the top two customers about 77%; in Q2 2026 the largest three unnamed customers were 36%, 26% and 10% (the letters may refer to different customers in different periods). Nebius has disclosed long-term contracts with Microsoft and Meta; its March 16, 2026 Meta agreement is worth up to about $27 billion. The full contract ledger is in who are CoreWeave’s customers.

On the lending side, CoreWeave owed $35.6 billion of debt principal at June 30, 2026: loans secured by GPUs and customer contracts, unsecured bonds with 8.50%–9.75% coupons, convertible notes and equipment-vendor financing. How those pieces differ, and what the 15% bond yields of October 2026 mean, is in CoreWeave’s debt explained. The suppliers (Nvidia for chips, memory makers, network, power and cooling) are mapped in who gets paid when AI data centers get built.

How volatile are neocloud stocks?

Much more than the market: the listed neoclouds and landlords have had roughly eight to nine times the S&P 500’s volatility over the past year. In Exent market data to Sep 30, 2026, CoreWeave fell 57.5% from peak to trough within the year while the S&P 500’s largest drop was 9.1%. The full table for every listed name is in neocloud stocks compared.

Those figures end on September 30. October was worse for the group: CNBC reported on October 21, 2026 that CoreWeave was down 36% for the month, Nebius 33% and IREN 38%, as rising bond yields and concerns about AI debt hit the most indebted names first. These moves are history, not a forecast. For how large a slot such stocks get in a plan, see how big a speculative sleeve should be.

What are the main risks, and when is the neocloud story wrong?

The risks are concentrated and checkable in the filings. Five numbers cover most of them; each links to the page that explains it.

RiskThe number to checkExample (dated)Where it is explained
Customer concentrationTop customer’s share of revenueCoreWeave: 36% in Q2 2026 (67% Microsoft in 2025)Customers
Debt and refinancingInterest vs operating income; principal due in 18 monthsCoreWeave: $640M vs −$49M; $10.6B due by end-2027Debt
Contract qualityFirm term vs options; RPO vs backlog vs ARRTeraWulf lease: ~$19B base, up to ~$33B with optionsBacklog
GPU obsolescenceDepreciation life of the chipsCoreWeave: six years since 2023Depreciation
Comparing the namesSame metric, same date, for each companyQ2 2026 filingsCompared

Counterexample, when the bearish reading is wrong: much of the secured debt is repaid from contracts with investment-grade customers, and lenders price those loans far below the bonds (IREN financed its Microsoft contract at a weighted 6.0%; Nebius’s first asset-backed loan priced at a floating benchmark rate plus 2.50%). If contracts are delivered and renewed at similar prices, the model can work even with heavy debt. When the bullish reading is wrong: a large backlog is not cash, delivery delays push revenue out while interest keeps running, and a customer that does not renew leaves GPUs to re-rent at whatever the market pays. Gartner’s June 23, 2026 forecast gives neoclouds 20% of a $267 billion AI cloud market by 2030, and its October 14 release expects most of them to be absorbed or to close; both are forecasts, not facts.

Who this is not for: an investor who needs the money within a few years, or whose portfolio already leans on the same AI theme through Nvidia or big tech (see your portfolio if the AI bubble bursts and big tech AI spending in 2026). A neocloud ETF exists: Roundhill launched NCLD on August 6, 2026 with Nebius (30.83%) and CoreWeave (27.30%) at 58% of the fund at launch, so it is a concentrated bet on the same names, not diversification (see thematic ETFs).

  • Limitations: company figures are from each company’s latest filing or release, with different quarter ends (June 30 or August 31, 2026); they go stale when Q3 reports arrive in November 2026.
  • Contract measures (backlog, ARR, contracted revenue) are company-defined and not comparable across companies; Nebius’s payback and per-megawatt figures are company estimates.
  • Stock statistics are Exent market data to Sep 30, 2026; October moves are reported press figures, not Exent data. Past volatility does not predict future returns.
  • Private neocloud figures are excluded because they are not audited; Gartner figures are forecasts by a research firm.

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Frequently asked questions

A neocloud is a cloud provider built around renting GPU computing power to AI developers and big tech, usually under multi-year contracts. CoreWeave, Nebius and IREN are listed examples as of October 2026.

CoreWeave is a neocloud. About 98% of its Q2 2026 revenue came from committed GPU contracts, and Microsoft alone was about 67% of its 2025 revenue, whereas hyperscalers sell hundreds of services to millions of customers.

No. Oracle is a diversified software and cloud company with $19.3 billion of quarterly revenue and $664 billion of remaining performance obligations (quarter to Aug 31, 2026), though its AI build-out raises similar funding questions: free cash flow was negative $5 billion that quarter.

A hyperscaler such as AWS, Azure or Google Cloud funds GPUs from many other profitable services. A neocloud depends mostly on GPU rental contracts, debt and new shares, which makes it more exposed to a few customers and to interest rates.

Listed GPU clouds include CoreWeave (CRWV), Nebius (NBIS) and IREN (IREN). Companies that lease powered data centers to them, such as Applied Digital, TeraWulf, Cipher Digital, Hut 8, Galaxy and Core Scientific, are often grouped with them but carry landlord rather than GPU risk.

No. Gartner said on October 14, 2026 that over 80% of neocloud providers will cease independent operations by 2030, which includes being acquired or merged, because of cost pressure and a lack of a differentiating business model.

They sign take-or-pay contracts for GPU capacity, often with a prepayment, buy the chips largely with loans secured by those contracts, and earn the gap between the contract price and the cost of power, buildings, depreciation and interest. CoreWeave still lost $626 million in Q2 2026.

Yes. Roundhill launched the Neocloud ETF (NCLD) on August 6, 2026. At launch Nebius and CoreWeave made up about 58% of the fund, so it is concentrated in the same few names.

They combine fast growth, heavy debt and a few large customers. In Exent market data to Sep 30, 2026, most listed neoclouds and their landlords had annualized volatility of about 95–110%, against 11.9% for the S&P 500.

Sources

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