Why 95% of Investors Can’t Beat the S&P 500 (and What Actually Helps)
Charlie Munger put the odds at roughly 95% against. The data on professionals and individuals points the same way. The reasons are structural, and most of them can be fixed.
The honest answer to the most asked question in investing: how many people beat the index, why it is so hard, what historically moved the odds, and how to measure your own results so you know where you stand.
A minority, and the share shrinks the longer you look. The standard scorecard is S&P Dow Jones Indices’ SPIVA report, which compares actively managed US funds with their benchmark after fees and counts funds that closed or merged along the way.
| Period | Active large-cap US funds that trailed the S&P 500 | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Calendar year 2024 | 65% | SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025 |
| Calendar year 2025 | 79% | SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025 |
| First half of 2026 | 67% | SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2026 |
| 5 years to Jun 30, 2026 | 89% | SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2026 |
| 20 years to Jun 30, 2026 | 93% | SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2026 |
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard. S&P described 2025 as the fourth-worst year for active large-cap managers in the scorecard’s 25-year history. The mid-year 2026 report also found that only about 37% of the large-cap funds that existed 20 years earlier were still operating.
Individual investors face a second gap on top of fund returns: timing. Morningstar’s 2026 Mind the Gap study estimated that the average dollar in US mutual funds and ETFs earned 8.7% a year over the 10 years to December 31, 2025, while the funds themselves returned 9.9%. The 1.2-point difference came from when investors bought and sold.
Go deeper: what percentage of fund managers beat the market, why most investors can’t beat the S&P 500 and whether beating the S&P 500 is a realistic goal.
Because a few huge winners drive most of the index’s return, and a typical portfolio of a few dozen stocks is more likely to miss them than to catch them. Hendrik Bessembinder’s study “Do stocks outperform Treasury bills?” (Journal of Financial Economics, 2018) found that the best-performing 4% of listed US companies explained the entire net gain of the US stock market since 1926.
Exent’s own data shows the same skew among today’s largest companies:
| Period to Sep 30, 2026 | Stocks measured | Beat the S&P 500 | Median stock, total return | S&P 500 (SPY), total return | Lost money |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 year | 477 | 188 (39.4%) | +4.7% | +15.1% | 195 |
| 3 years | 477 | 178 (37.3%) | +54.6% | +84.1% | 76 |
| 5 years | 468 | 182 (38.9%) | +60.6% | +89.1% | 94 |
| 10 years | 422 | 152 (36.0%) | +239.2% | +310.7% | 20 |
Universe: the 500 largest US-listed stocks by market value today, with price history for the full period. This list has survivorship bias: companies that shrank, were acquired or went bankrupt are not in it, so the true share of stocks that beat the index was lower. On a risk-adjusted basis the bar was higher still: only 94 of 468 stocks beat the S&P 500’s Sharpe ratio over 5 years.
Four forces make the index hard to beat:
Some managers do for a while, but the evidence says outperformance rarely persists long enough to be identified in advance. S&P’s U.S. Persistence Scorecard (year-end 2025) found that, outside small caps, none of the funds in the top quartile of their category in 2021 stayed in the top quartile every year through 2025. Only 4.5% of above-median large-cap funds stayed above the median for the whole period, below the 6.25% that pure chance would produce.
That does not prove skill is absent. It shows that a few good years are weak evidence. Telling skill from luck takes many years of returns, compared with a benchmark that carries the same risk.
| Go deeper | What it answers |
|---|---|
| Skill vs luck | How to tell whether your returns are skill or luck: sample size and risk-adjusted alpha. |
| How hedge funds try to beat the market | Leverage, shorting, factor bets and risk budgets, and how the results compare. |
| Do stock-picking newsletters beat the S&P 500? | What third-party tracking shows, and why survivorship flatters newsletters. |
| Can AI beat the stock market? | Evidence on AI funds and AI stock scores, and where AI helps. |
| How to track smart money | What Berkshire and other large funds hold in 13F filings, and whether Buffett beat the index. |
Compare your return with a benchmark that carries the same risk, over the same dates, and look at return per unit of risk, not return alone. Most self-directed investors compare a concentrated growth portfolio with the S&P 500, or a dividend portfolio with the S&P 500, and draw the wrong conclusion either way.
Three corrections fix most of the error:
For reference, here is what the benchmark itself did, with dividends reinvested:
| Year | S&P 500 (SPY) total return |
|---|---|
| 2017 | +21.7% |
| 2018 | −4.6% |
| 2019 | +31.2% |
| 2020 | +18.3% |
| 2021 | +28.7% |
| 2022 | −18.2% |
| 2023 | +26.2% |
| 2024 | +24.9% |
| 2025 | +17.7% |
| 2026 to Sep 30 | +12.1% |
Source: same data, as of Sep 30, 2026. Those were unusually strong years, so a good result in absolute terms can still trail.
| Go deeper | What it answers |
|---|---|
| Lagging the S&P 500 this year | Whether trailing the index in a Mag 7-led year is a problem. |
| What is a good annual return? | Historical index returns, and why the answer depends on the risk taken. |
| S&P 500 average annual return | Long-run nominal and real returns, by decade. |
| S&P 500 annual returns | The best and worst calendar years. |
| S&P 500 expected returns | The range of published 10-year forecasts, and why they differ. |
| How to benchmark a dividend portfolio | Dividend index options that fit an income portfolio better than the S&P 500. |
Rarely on both counts. In backtests from July 2016 to September 2026, 4 of 18 well-known strategies beat the S&P 500’s annual return of 15.2%, and only 3 beat its Sharpe ratio of 0.88. Most strategies that cut volatility also cut return in a decade led by US large-cap growth.
| Strategy (backtest) | Return / yr | Volatility | Sharpe | Max drawdown | Years beating S&P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Magnificent 7, equal weight | +36.5% | 26.3% | 1.25 | −45.7% | 8/9 |
| Nasdaq-100 | +21.5% | 18.8% | 1.03 | −32.6% | 7/9 |
| S&P 500 Growth | +17.8% | 17.2% | 0.92 | −30.5% | 7/9 |
| S&P 500 (buy and hold) | +15.2% | 15.2% | 0.88 | −23.9% | — |
| Max-Sharpe optimized | +13.5% | 13.6% | 0.83 | −30.5% | 3/6 |
| Momentum factor | +16.2% | 18.0% | 0.81 | −30.2% | 5/9 |
| Quality factor | +14.2% | 15.5% | 0.81 | −27.8% | 3/9 |
| Dividend growth | +12.6% | 13.4% | 0.80 | −20.2% | 3/9 |
| 60/40, rebalanced yearly | +9.6% | 10.1% | 0.76 | −20.1% | 2/9 |
| 60/40, rebalanced monthly | +9.5% | 10.1% | 0.75 | −20.0% | 2/9 |
| High-dividend equity | +12.2% | 15.2% | 0.70 | −21.6% | 2/9 |
| S&P 500 Value | +11.4% | 15.2% | 0.66 | −25.3% | 2/9 |
| 10-month trend filter | +9.4% | 11.6% | 0.66 | −21.9% | 0/9 |
| Risk parity (inverse volatility) | +8.7% | 10.4% | 0.65 | −23.0% | 2/8 |
| Minimum volatility | +9.4% | 12.2% | 0.63 | −19.1% | 2/9 |
| Equal-weight S&P 500 | +11.5% | 16.5% | 0.62 | −26.7% | 2/9 |
| Small caps (Russell 2000) | +10.4% | 20.7% | 0.48 | −32.3% | 1/9 |
| All-weather-style mix | +5.1% | 9.0% | 0.38 | −21.6% | 1/9 |
| Minimum-variance optimized | +0.7% | 5.9% | −0.27 | −17.1% | 1/6 |
Sorted by Sharpe ratio; the highlighted row is the benchmark. Periods run July 2016 to September 2026, except risk parity (from July 2017) and the two optimized portfolios (from July 2019). The Magnificent 7 basket is chosen with hindsight: those seven companies are on the list because they became the biggest winners, so its result could not have been planned in 2016. Compare every strategy on the strategies page.
Backtested (hypothetical) results calculated by Exent from historical ETF and stock prices with dividends reinvested and no trading costs or taxes beyond the funds’ own fees. Backtests are not actual trading and carry hindsight bias. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
The levers that mattered were mostly about avoiding losses to costs, behaviour and hidden risk, not about finding the next big winner. None of them guarantees outperformance.
| Lever | What the evidence showed | Go deeper |
|---|---|---|
| Keep costs low | Fees and taxes are the one certain drag. They compound against you every year. | After-fee, after-tax returns |
| Size concentration on purpose | Concentration is how anyone beats an index, and also how most people trail it. In the backtest, the most concentrated basket had the deepest drawdown (−45.7%). | Mag 7 and the index |
| Choose factor tilts deliberately | Value, growth, momentum, dividends and sectors took turns leading. Over this decade, growth and momentum led; value and small caps lagged. | Value vs growth, sector rotation, Dogs of the Dow, US vs international |
| Stay invested | Historically, a lump sum in the S&P 500 beat 12 monthly purchases in 84.8% of 112 rolling 12-month windows, by 7.4% on average. | Lump sum vs DCA, buy the dip vs DCA |
| Control drawdowns | A similar return with a smaller fall is a risk-adjusted win, and it is easier to hold through a crash. | Beating the market with less risk |
Market timing deserves its own warning. In the backtest above, the 10-month trend filter cut the COVID-crash loss to −7.7% from −19.4% for the S&P 500, but it still lost −20.1% in 2022 and returned 9.4% a year against 15.2%. Timing rules trade upside for a smaller crash, and they do not always deliver the smaller crash.
For most self-directed investors, the achievable target is not “beat the S&P 500 every year”. It is “earn a fair return for the risk I actually carry, and stop giving returns away”. That goal is measurable, and it is within your control:
The portfolio optimization guide explains how to raise return per unit of risk, and the portfolio analysis guide covers the checks that find hidden risk.
Most investors and about 93% of active large-cap funds did not over 20 years (SPIVA, 2026). What historically helped was low costs, deliberate concentration and factor tilts, staying invested and controlling drawdowns, measured against a risk-matched benchmark.
In 2025, 21% of active large-cap US funds beat the S&P 500 and 79% trailed it, according to S&P Dow Jones Indices’ SPIVA scorecard. Over the 20 years to June 30, 2026, about 93% trailed.
It is rare and hard to identify in advance. SPIVA’s persistence data shows that top-performing funds almost never stay at the top for five straight years, and large-cap results looked no better than chance.
A small number of very large winners drive most of its return, so most individual stocks trail it. Fees, taxes and badly timed trades widen the gap.
In Exent’s data to Sep 30, 2026, 152 of 422 of today’s largest US stocks (36.0%) beat the S&P 500 over 10 years. The list excludes companies that shrank or disappeared, so the true share was lower.
Only if your portfolio carries similar risk. A fairer test is whether you beat a risk-matched benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis over several years.
Exent builds your risk-matched benchmark and compares return, Sharpe, Sortino and drawdown with it, so you know whether you are being paid for the risk you take.
Educational content, not investment advice. Examples are illustrative; past performance does not guarantee future results.