# What Is Shadow Banking? Money Funds, Private Credit and Run Risk

> Shadow banking is lending and money-like saving that happens outside banks: money market funds, repo, hedge funds, securitization and private credit. The broader nonbank financial sector held 51% of global financial assets in 2024; the FSB’s narrower measure of bank-like nonbank risks was $76.3 trillion. Here is what it is, how big each part is, why parts of it can run without deposit insurance, and how it plugs back into banks.

Source: https://www.exent.ai/resources/what-is-shadow-banking · Reviewed by David, Senior Analyst, Exent · Published Nov 9, 2026 · Updated Nov 9, 2026

## Key takeaways

- Shadow banking, which regulators now call non-bank financial intermediation, is credit and money-like saving provided by firms that are not banks: money market funds, investment and hedge funds, dealers, securitization vehicles and private credit funds.
- It held $256.8 trillion in 2024, 51% of global financial assets, and grew 9.4% that year against 4.7% for banks (Financial Stability Board).
- The risk is bank-like without the bank safety net: investments that promise cash on demand can face runs with no deposit insurance, as money funds did in September 2008 and in March 2020, when prime and municipal funds’ assets fell by $129 billion in three weeks (New York Fed).
- It is not separate from banks: US banks had $2.6 trillion of credit commitments to non-bank financial firms at the end of 2025, and private credit vehicles borrowed $349 billion from banks (Federal Reserve).
- “Shadow” does not mean illegal or unregulated. Money market funds are SEC-regulated; what they lack is deposit insurance and routine access to the central bank.

## What is shadow banking in simple terms?

Shadow banking is bank-like activity done by firms that are not banks. A bank takes deposits that can be withdrawn any day and makes loans that last years. A money market fund does the first part (shares you can sell today at about $1), a private credit fund does the second (multi-year loans to companies), and the repo market links them by lending cash overnight against bonds. The Financial Stability Board, which tracks it for the G20, calls the whole sector non-bank financial intermediation and puts it at $256.8 trillion in 2024, 51% of global financial assets ([FSB](https://www.fsb.org/2025/12/fsb-reports-continued-growth-in-nonbank-financial-intermediation-in-2024-to-256-8-trillion/)). Its narrower measure, covering activities that can create bank-like risks such as runs and leverage, grew 12% to $76.3 trillion.

**Scope.** US-centred, with global totals from the FSB. Covered: money market funds, repo, hedge funds, broker-dealers, securitization and private credit. Not covered: insurers and pension funds in depth, crypto lending, and which fund to hold your cash in (see [where to park large cash](https://www.exent.ai/resources/where-to-park-large-cash)). Education, not advice.

## What are the main parts of shadow banking, and how big is each?

| Part | What it does | Size (US unless noted) | As of | Run or leverage risk |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| All non-bank financial intermediation (global) | Every financial firm that is not a bank or central bank | $256.8T (51% of global financial assets) | 2024 | Varies by part |
| Money market funds | Take cash, lend it short term to the Treasury, banks, dealers and companies | $7.94T | Week to Oct 21, 2026 | Prime funds can run; government funds usually gain inflows in stress |
| Repo | Overnight cash loans against bonds | $12.6T of daily exposures | Q3 2025 average | Lenders can refuse to roll overnight |
| Hedge funds | Trade with borrowed money | $13.7T of total assets; leverage near record highs | Q3 2025 | Margin calls force sales |
| Broker-dealers | Make markets, finance clients | $7.1T of total assets | Q4 2025 | Funding runs (as in 2008) |
| Securitization | Pool loans into bonds | $14.3T outstanding ($12.5T agency) | Q4 2025 | Low for agency; higher for private-label |
| Private credit | Funds lend directly to mid-sized companies | About $1.5T of loans; vehicles’ assets above $2.6T | Q4 2025 | Mostly locked-up money; semi-liquid funds can cap redemptions |

Sources: FSB (global); ICI weekly data for money funds ([ICI](https://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmf)); the Office of Financial Research for repo ([OFR](https://www.financialresearch.gov/the-ofr-blog/2025/12/04/sizing-us-repo-market/)); the Fed’s May 2026 Financial Stability Report for hedge funds, dealers and securitization ([Federal Reserve](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-may-financial-stability-report-leverage.htm)); and a Fed staff note that added private credit to the US Financial Accounts in September 2026 ([Federal Reserve](https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/introducing-private-credit-into-the-financial-accounts-of-the-united-states-20261016.html)). For comparison, US banks and credit unions held $29.2 trillion of assets at the end of 2025. Figures overlap (a hedge fund’s repo loan appears in two rows), so the rows cannot be added up.

## How does money flow through the shadow banking system?

Follow a dollar of savings. It goes into a money market fund, which lends it overnight to a dealer in repo, taking Treasuries as collateral. The dealer lends it on to a hedge fund that buys more Treasuries, and those Treasuries become collateral again. In the second half of 2025 hedge funds borrowed more than $1.8 trillion net in repo ([OFR](https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRBrief-26-03-who-participates-in-repo.pdf)). On the longer side, pension funds, insurers and wealthy individuals commit money to private credit funds for years, and those funds lend to companies, often with a bank credit line behind them. The repo step is explained in detail in [what is the repo market](https://www.exent.ai/resources/what-is-the-repo-market).

**Where shadow banking gets and lends money**

Savers and investors:
- Households and companies (cash they want back fast)
- Pensions, insurers, wealthy (money they can lock up)

Non-bank intermediaries:
- Money market funds ($7.94T)
- Private credit funds (~$1.5T of loans)

Market funding:
- Dealers (repo) ($12.6T daily exposures)
- Hedge funds (leverage near record)

Borrowers and backstops:
- Companies and the Treasury
- Banks ($2.6T of credit lines to non-banks)

Flows:
- Households and companies → Money market funds: shares redeemable daily
- Pensions, insurers, wealthy → Private credit funds: commitments locked for years
- Money market funds → Dealers (repo): overnight cash against Treasuries
- Dealers (repo) → Hedge funds: cash lent on, bonds pledged again
- Private credit funds → Companies and the Treasury: direct loans to mid-sized firms
- Hedge funds → Companies and the Treasury: buys Treasuries and corporate debt
- Banks → Private credit funds: credit lines and loans ($349B)
- Banks → Dealers (repo): lend to and own dealers

*Sizes: ICI (money funds, week to Oct 21, 2026); OFR (repo, Q3 2025); Federal Reserve FSR May 2026 and FEDS Note Oct 16, 2026 (hedge funds, bank commitments, private credit, Q3–Q4 2025).*

## Why can shadow banks have runs without deposit insurance?

A bank run stops when depositors believe they will be paid, which deposit insurance and the central bank’s discount window are built to guarantee. A money fund share has neither: it is an investment, and if the fund’s assets lose value, the last investors out bear the loss. That creates a first-mover advantage, which is exactly what turns worry into a run.

| Episode | What ran | Dated numbers | What stopped it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| September 2008 | Prime money funds, after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck | $785M of Lehman paper in a $65B fund; share value $0.97 on Sept 16; about $200B left prime funds in two days | Treasury guarantee of money fund shares and a Fed facility (Sept 19, 2008) |
| March 2020 | Prime and municipal money funds | Assets fell $120B (15%) and $9B (7%) between March 2 and March 23 | Fed Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (March 18, 2020) |
| 2026 (as of May) | Some private credit funds sold to individuals | Higher redemption requests at some business development companies with limited redemption rights (Fed Vice Chair for Supervision, May 2026) | No backstop; quarterly redemption caps limit what funds pay out |

Sources: [SEC](https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2009-104-sec-charges-operators-reserve-primary-fund-fraud) and [New York Fed](https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/06/money-market-funds-and-systemic-risk/) (2008); [New York Fed](https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/05/the-money-market-mutual-fund-liquidity-facility/) (2020); [Federal Reserve](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20260508a.htm) (2026). In July 2023 the SEC adopted reforms removing liquidity-threshold-linked redemption gates and introducing, on phased compliance dates, a requirement for institutional prime and tax-exempt funds to charge a liquidity fee when daily net redemptions exceed 5% of net assets, subject to the rule’s de minimis exception ([SEC](https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-129)). The fee makes leavers, not stayers, pay for the cost of selling. Other episodes, including the 2022 UK pension-fund collateral spiral, are in [how financial crises spread](https://www.exent.ai/resources/how-financial-crises-spread).

## Why does leaving first pay? A worked example

Take the Reserve Primary Fund’s real starting point, $65 billion of assets and $785 million of Lehman paper, and make the rest illustrative. If the Lehman paper is worth zero and nobody has left yet, the loss is $0.785B ÷ $65B = 1.2%, so each $1 share is worth about $0.988.

Now suppose $25 billion of shares are redeemed at $1.00 before the fund reprices. The fund pays out $25 billion of good assets, and the whole $785 million loss falls on the investors who stayed: ($65B − $0.785B − $25B) ÷ 40 billion remaining shares = $0.980 a share. The early leavers lost nothing; the stayers lost 2%, about 1.6 times the original 1.2% hit. That arithmetic is why money fund runs accelerate once investors suspect a loss, and why the 2023 liquidity fee charges the people leaving.

## Is private credit the next shadow banking risk?

Private credit has grown from about $350 billion of fund assets in 2012 to more than $2.6 trillion at the end of 2025, with about $1.5 trillion of loans to US businesses (Federal Reserve staff note). Banks’ share of corporate lending fell from 48% in 2015 to 29% in 2025, according to Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman. Most of this money is less runnable than a money fund: institutional private debt funds lock investors in for 7 to 10 years. The newer exception is “semi-liquid” funds sold to individuals, $425 billion of gross assets at the end of 2025; most perpetual business development companies say they will cap redemptions at 5% of net asset value a quarter ([Fed FSR, May 2026](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-may-financial-stability-report-funding-risks.htm)).

- Where the risk can reach banks: bank credit commitments to non-bank financial firms were $2.6 trillion at the end of 2025, about a quarter of it to private equity, business development companies and private credit (Fed FSR).
- Where it can reach investors: a redemption cap protects the fund, but it means you may not get your money out when you ask.
- Where it is hard to see: the FSB says private credit data have severe limitations, and the Fed only added these funds to the national Financial Accounts in September 2026.

## Is shadow banking dangerous?

Not by itself. Much of it does what banks do with less leverage and longer-locked money: a fund with locked ten-year commitments is less exposed to investor-redemption runs, though borrowing and collateral arrangements can still create funding stress, and government money funds, which hold only Treasuries, agency debt and repo backed by them, usually gain money in a panic. The Fed’s May 2026 report described funding risks as moderate and financial-sector leverage as a notable vulnerability, with hedge fund leverage near all-time highs. Treating every non-bank as a hidden 2008 overstates the risk; ignoring how much of it promises cash on demand, or borrows overnight, understates it.

**Limitations.** Definitions differ: the FSB’s $256.8 trillion includes pension funds and insurers, the Fed’s private credit figure is $1.4 trillion in its stability report and $1.5 trillion in its newer Financial Accounts measure, and dates range from 2024 to October 2026. Hedge fund data come from regulatory filings with a lag. Nothing here forecasts a run. The wider map, including where these firms meet the Fed, is in [how the financial system works](https://www.exent.ai/resources/how-the-financial-system-works), and how money market funds compare with Treasury bill funds for your own cash in [SGOV vs BIL vs SHV](https://www.exent.ai/compare/sgov-vs-bil-vs-shv).

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## Frequently asked questions

### What is an example of shadow banking?

A money market fund that lends investors’ cash overnight to a dealer in the repo market is the classic example: it offers cash on demand and lends short term, like a bank, but without deposit insurance. Private credit funds that lend directly to companies are another.

### How big is shadow banking?

The Financial Stability Board measured non-bank financial intermediation at $256.8 trillion in 2024, 51% of global financial assets. Its narrower measure of activities with bank-like risks was $76.3 trillion.

### What role did shadow banking play in the 2008 financial crisis?

Runs on repo, commercial paper and money funds spread the losses. After Lehman failed, the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck on September 16, 2008 and about $200 billion left prime money funds in two days, until the Treasury guaranteed fund shares.

### Can a money market fund lose money?

Yes. Money funds are investments, not deposits, and are not FDIC insured. The Reserve Primary Fund fell to $0.97 a share in 2008, and prime funds lost 15% of their assets to redemptions in three weeks of March 2020 before a Fed facility stopped the outflow.

### Is private credit shadow banking?

Yes, it is lending by non-banks. US private credit loans were about $1.5 trillion at the end of 2025 (Federal Reserve). Most of the money is locked up for years, but semi-liquid funds sold to individuals, $425 billion of gross assets, allow limited quarterly redemptions.

### Is shadow banking regulated?

Parts of it are, by securities regulators rather than bank regulators: money funds follow SEC rules, and advisers to large hedge funds report their funds’ leverage to the SEC on Form PF. What it lacks is deposit insurance and routine access to central bank lending.

### How are banks connected to shadow banks?

Banks lend to them and own some of them. US banks had $2.6 trillion of credit commitments to non-bank financial firms at the end of 2025, and private credit vehicles had $349 billion of bank loans (Federal Reserve).

## Sources

1. [FSB reports continued growth in non-bank financial intermediation in 2024 to $256.8 trillion](https://www.fsb.org/2025/12/fsb-reports-continued-growth-in-nonbank-financial-intermediation-in-2024-to-256-8-trillion/) — Financial Stability Board, 2025-12-16
2. [Financial Stability Report, May 2026: Leverage in the Financial Sector](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-may-financial-stability-report-leverage.htm) — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-05-28
3. [Financial Stability Report, May 2026: Funding Risks (incl. box on private credit)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-may-financial-stability-report-funding-risks.htm) — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-05-28
4. [Introducing Private Credit into the Financial Accounts of the United States (FEDS Notes)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/introducing-private-credit-into-the-financial-accounts-of-the-united-states-20261016.html) — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-10-16
5. [When Regulation Reshapes Markets: The Migration of Corporate Lending (Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20260508a.htm) — Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-05-08
6. [Money Market Fund Assets](https://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmf) — Investment Company Institute, 2026-10-21
7. [Sizing the U.S. Repo Market](https://www.financialresearch.gov/the-ofr-blog/2025/12/04/sizing-us-repo-market/) — Office of Financial Research, 2025-12-04
8. [Who Participates in Repo? (OFR Brief 26-03)](https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRBrief-26-03-who-participates-in-repo.pdf) — Office of Financial Research, 2026-03-31
9. [SEC Charges Operators of Reserve Primary Fund With Fraud (2009-104)](https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2009-104-sec-charges-operators-reserve-primary-fund-fraud) — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009-05-05
10. [Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk](https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/06/money-market-funds-and-systemic-risk/) — Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, 2012-06-11
11. [The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility](https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/05/the-money-market-mutual-fund-liquidity-facility/) — Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, 2020-05-08
12. [SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reforms (2023-129)](https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-129) — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2023-07-12

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